In Real Estate Auction Sales, a Description of Property Sufficiently Meets the Statute of Frauds Requirements if the Description Applies to one Parcel of Property Owned By The Seller

In Robinson v. Black, 73 N.M. 116 (N.M. 1963), the Supreme Court of New Mexico was to decide if the written memoranda in this case sufficiently described the real estate to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The case involved a real estate auction in which the purchaser repudiated the sale and pleaded statute of frauds. The Appellant seller brought a suit against the purchaser for breach of real estate contract.  The trial court ruled in favor of the purchaser finding that the contract did not meet the statute of fraud requirements. 

In Robinson, the seller alleged that the property in question was offered for sale as a unit and the purchaser bid on this unit. Id. at 117. However, the purchaser denied this allegation stating that the Appellant misrepresented the quantity of real estate being sold. Id. The Appellant contended that memorandum of sale contained the following language: "real estate purchased at auction from Ray Robinson Estate in Carlsbad, N.M. on Aug. 17, 1961." Id. at 119. The Appellant stated that, although the memorandum did not include a precise and exact legal description of the land offered for sale, the description in the memorandum includes data that would help in identifying the property offered for sale. Id. The Appellant further stated that parol evidence is admissible in order to apply the property description in the memoranda to the property sold at the real estate auction. Id.

The Court found that the Appellant’s contention has merits because the property description in the memoranda can apply only to one tract of land that the Appellant owned and sold in the manner and at the time and place referred to in the memorandum description. Id. at 119-20. The Court referred to cases such as Pitek v. McGuire, 51 N.M. 364, 184 P.2d 647, 1 A.L.R.2d 830 and  Preble v. Higgins, 43 R.I. 10, 109 A. 707 in order to understand the standards required to satisfy the statute of fraud requirements. 
 
In Pitek, the Supreme Court briefed the elements that need to be there in a memorandum of oral sale of real estate for it to satisfy the statute of frauds. The Court stated that, "‘[i]t is true that a memorandum of an oral sale of real estate need not be made with the formality of a deed; but it must contain a sufficient description of the land, or furnish the means or data within itself which points to evidence that will identify it * * *’." Id. at 120. (quoting Pitek, 51 N.M. at 377). 

Preble was yet another case that involved a situation similar to the present case.  The Preble court stated that:

* * * The receipt names the purchaser. It is signed by the vendor's agent, and it states the purchase price. The real estate is described as the 'property sold this day' (September 5, 1918) 'at auction-- Pawtucket Ave. East Prov.' The rule is that a description is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds if the description can apply to but one parcel of property owned by the seller; the property may then be identified by parol. But the description is insufficient if it applies equally well to more than one parcel of property owned by the seller. * * *
Id. (quoting Preble, 109 A. at 710). 
 
In light of the above discussions, the Court concluded that the description of property in the memorandum of sale was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. The Court ruled in favor of the seller and reversed the trial court’s decision.